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I. THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
The Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) was founded as a
regional organization of all African states in 1963. Its name and the
date of its founding tell a great deal about it. The O.A.U. came
into being as Africa was being decolonized. The independent states
of the continent were already numerous, but they were also poor,
weak, and, in many respects, dependent on the former metropoli-
tan countries. The leaders of the continent felt that Africa was still
vulnerable to external pressure and aggression. They feared that a
divided and weak Africa would continue to be dominated by for-
eign powers.
The independent states of Africa concluded that a unification of
the continent was essential to the progress of African peoples. For-
mal political independence would not end foreign influence by it-
self; nor would it guarantee peace and prosperity to a vast and
fragmented continent. This point was driven home in the three
years after the Congo's accession to independence. The assassina-
tion of Lumumba, the secession of Katanga, and the intervention
of mercenaries and foreign powers destroyed a nation and caused
turmoil on the continent. After the Congo debacle, African nations
saw that unity was imperative.
However, the leaders of Africa had very different visions of the
future. They were all, of course, influenced by the great Pan-Afri-
can dream, but they were divided over the practical matter of de-
vising a charter for African unity. Some leaders, forming a "radical
group" around Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Toure of
Guinea, and others, believed in a unified Africa with a continent-
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wide organization that would have extensive powers. Other leaders,
most of them from Francophone states still dependent to a degree
on France, were political "moderates." They wanted a regional or-
ganization with clearly circumscribed powers, but not one that
would be able to challenge the status quo.1
This division profoundly affected the nature of the organization
which was created in Addis Ababa on May 25, 1963. The Charter
of the Organization of African Unity was the result of a compro-
mise between the moderates and the radicals. The radicals and
their allies did succeed in gaining agreement on an all-Africa or-
ganization. The moderates, however, were able to ensure that the
Charter conferred only limited powers on the new organization.
The Charter of the O.A.U. describes the common purposes of the
founding member states. These purposes are not dissimilar to
those found in the Charter of the United Nations. The emphasis,
however, in the Charter of the O.A.U. is on promoting "the unity
and solidarity of the African States."2 The O.A.U. is also commit-
ted to the eradication of "all forms of colonialism in Africa."3 This
commitment has played an important role in defining O.A.U. poli-
cies and priorities over the last twenty years.
The Charter of the O.A.U., in contrast to the United Nations
Charter, does not provide for collective measures to prevent or re-
move threats to international peace and security. It states only
that members "shall co-ordinate and harmonize" their policies for
defense and security," an aim which has proved elusive in practice.
The O.A.U. Charter affirms the principles of the sovereign equal-
ity of states, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, re-
spect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state, the
peaceful settlement of disputes, the emancipation of all dependent
African territories, and non-alignment in foreign policy. It also
condemns unreservedly all forms of "political assassination" and
"subversive activities.""
The institutions created by the O.A.U. to give effect to articles II
and III, however, are of a decidedly different order from those cre-
For a discussion of the differences among founders of the O.A.U., see M. WOLFERS,
POLITICS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (1976); see also Z. CERVENKA, THE UNFIN-
ISHED QUEST FOR UNITY: AFRICA AND THE O.A.U. (1977).
O.A.U. CHARTER art. II, para. 1(a).
Id. art. II, para. 1(d).
Id. art. II, para. 2(f).
• Id. art. III, paras. 1-4, 6, 7.
6 Id. art. III, para. 5.
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ated under the United Nations Charter. The supreme. organ of the
O.A.U. is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It gen-
erally meets once a year to "discuss matters of common concern to
Africa."'7 The Council of Ministers created under article XII is re-
sponsible for preparing meetings of the Assembly and for imple-
menting its decisions.8 A General Secretariat is responsible for ser-
vicing both the Assembly and the Council.9 Its Administrative
Secretary-General is appointed by the Assembly.10
It is evident that this structure has certain weaknesses. The As-
sembly of Heads of State and Government is inevitably an awk-
ward institution. It cannot function continuously; its busy mem-
bers can devote only a limited amount of time to O.A.U. affairs,
and the members of the Assembly cannot function as a "security
council" since they are neither directed to deal with disputes which
might threaten the peace, nor empowered to take collective action
binding on member states upon a determination that such a threat
exists. As there are no other institutions with significant power in
the O.A.U. system, the organization as a whole has only a limited
capacity to act in the settlement of disputes. It is neither designed
nor structured to play the same kind of role as the United Nations
in the field of peace and security.1
II. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN
UNITY
It is now generally accepted that the activities of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity fall within the provisions of the United Na-
tions Charter. The O.A.U. is recognized as a regional organization
under chapter VIII of that Charter, which defines the relationship
between the United Nations and regional organizations.
The United Nations Charter confers broad powers on the Secur-
ity Council in the settlement of disputes that threaten, or might
threaten, international peace and security. This mandate, however,
was not meant to exclude regional organizations from considering
such disputes. Article 52 of the Charter states that "[n]othing in
the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrange-
' Id. arts. VlII-IX.
6 Id. art. XIII, paras. 3-4.
9 Id. art. XVIII.
"0 Id. art. XVI.
11 For a useful analysis of the weaknesses of the O.A.U., see Tandon, The Organization
for African Unity: A Forum for African International Relations, 246 ROUND TABLE 221-30
(1972).
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ments for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional ac-
tion ... '"2 The activities of such organizations, of course, must
be compatible with the aims and principles of the United Nations
Charter.
The United Nations Charter, in fact, explicitly states that mem-
bers of the United Nations should "make every effort" to place
local disputes before regional organizations. The Charter further
states that the Security Council should encourage this procedure
by referring local disputes to regional organizations itself, if neces-
sary. 13 Thus, the Charter assigns regional organizations a clear role
in the peaceful settlement of disputes. It even implies that the par-
ties to local disputes should seek to settle their claims through the
offices of regional organizations before taking them to the Security
Council.
The Charter of the Organization of African Unity also helps to
lay the basis for defining the relationship between the United Na-
tions and the O.A.U. The founders of the O.A.U. did not explicitly
state their intention to set up a regional organization under chap-
ter VIII of the United Nations Charter. The indications are, how-
ever, that they saw themselves as building on what the Charter
had accomplished. The preamble of the O.A.U. Charter states that
the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights define a set of principles to which "we re-affirm our
adherence" and that provide "a solid foundation for peaceful and
positive co-operation among States."1
More importantly, article II of the O.A.U. Charter, which defines
the purposes of the Organization, commits members to promoting
"international co-operation having due regard to the Charter of the
United Nations."' 6 When this purpose is considered in conjunction
with the words of the preamble, the clear indication is that the
founding states intended the Organization to operate within the
framework of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
This is certainly the interpretation of most legal authorities on the
matter. 6
" U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.
S Id. art. 52, para. 3.
" O.A.U. CHARTER preamble.
' Id. art. II, para. 91(e).
See, e.g., Andemichael, The Organization of African Unity and the United Nations:
Relation in the Peace and Security Field, in REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS 225,
228-59 (1972).
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The O.A.U. thus seems to qualify as a regional agency under the
United Nations Charter. Its purposes and principles are compati-
ble with those of the United Nations, and it was intended to play,
and actually has played, a significant role in the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes between countries on the African continent.
III. THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL
AFFAIRS OF MEMBERS OF THE O.A.U.
The O.A.U. Charter pledges member states to the principle of
''non-interference in the internal affairs of States." This language
is very broad, and it reflects the intention of many of the O.A.U.'s
founders to ensure individual members full sovereignty and inde-
pendence of action. Although some founding member states took a
more universalist view in the arguments over the Charter, the ma-
jority feared interference in their affairs by stronger neighbors in
the name of Pan-Africanism. When the Charter was written these
fears were embodied in it. The founders of the O.A.U. adopted a
domestic jurisdiction clause that was meant to limit the powers of
the O.A.U., even in the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Or-
ganization of African Unity was never intended by the majority to
function as a supra-national organization.
From the beginning, therefore, the O.A.U. could concern itself
only minimally with issues which a member state might regard as
internal affairs. It was unable, for instance, to do anything about
the actions taken by the Amin Government against Ugandan
Asians, despite the fact that acts committed against them were in
clear violation of international law. 17 It was never able to intervene
in the war in the Sudan, despite the role which foreign powers
played in it. And it was unable to do more than attempt concilia-
tion-in which its efforts failed-in the Nigerian civil war.
The practice of the O.A.U. over the years has tended to empha-
size the right of member states to conduct their affairs as they see
fit. In fact, the O.A.U. has been able to assist in the settlement of
disputes only where the parties to them have been willing to accept
its intervention, and its role has been limited by the degree to
which the parties have been willing to accept proposed procedures
and solutions.
" Umozurike, The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the O.A.U. Charter, 78 AFRICAN AF-
FAIRS 197, 198 (1979).
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The broad language of the domestic jurisdiction clause is clearly
one reason for the limited role accorded to the O.A.U. It is not,
however, the only one. The effect of the domestic jurisdiction
clause is reinforced by a striking omission in the O.A.U. Charter: it
does not provide any mechanism to compel members to seek the
peaceful settlement of disputes. 18 The O.A.U. is not entitled to in-
tervene in a dispute which might threaten international peace and
security. This means that member states can ignore the Organiza-
tion if they choose to, especially in the early stages of a dispute
when its dangers may be only dimly perceived.
Thus, the practice of the O.A.U. has been somewhat different
from that of the United Nations. From the beginning, the provi-
sions of the O.A.U. Charter confined the Organization to a rela-
tively narrower role in the settlement of disputes.
IV. THE O.A.U. AND THE SETTLEMENT OF REGIONAL DISPUTES
The O.A.U. has given great emphasis to negotiations rather than
law in the settlement of disputes among African states. Disputes
have been settled through direct negotiations between states,
through ad hoc committees of heads of state, through the offices of
third parties, and in negotiations during the Assembly. The whole
approach has been one which treats states as sovereign and equal,
without any attempt to impose standards of law or conduct on the
parties concerned.
Again, this approach reflects the mistrust of foreign influences
which have been so strongly felt in Africa. The O.A.U. has thus
avoided resorting to judicial means of settlement. It has avoided
referring disputes to the International Court of Justice. It has even
been reluctant to rely on the rules of customary international law.
All of these have been seen as the products of an experience for-
eign to Africa and of little relevance to the settlement of disputes
among African states.
The Organization of African Unity has, in fact, developed its
own unique approach to the settlement of disputes. While the
scope for intervention has been limited, the O.A.U.'s approach has
been particularly suited to African conditions. The O.A.U. has paid
great attention to the requirements for the maintenance of African
unity, and this has given member states confidence in the proce-
" Okongwu, The O.A.U. Charter and the Principle of Domestic Jurisdiction in Intra-
African Affairs, 13 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 589, 591 (1973).
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dures that it has developed. As a result, these procedures can be
readily applied in the settlement of many regional disputes. Their
development has been a valuable achievement.
There are three main elements in the O.A.U.'s approach to the
settlement of disputes. Two of these are certainly unique to the
O.A.U. as a regional organization.
The first element is what Cervenka has called "the African
framework."19 The O.A.U. has sought to settle disputes within a
purely African framework. The Organization has not borrowed
standards of behavior or conduct from others, but has sought to
develop its own standards, basing them on the consensus of Afri-
can opinion on a particular matter. Solutions have been sought by
pushing the parties toward an agreement which reflects the con-
sensus. The formation of a consensus has consequently been an im-
portant part of the whole approach. When a consensus on an issue
emerges, the O.A.U. attempts to use the weight of African opinion
to move the parties closer to the common view and, therefore,
closer to a settlement.
The second important element in the O.A.U.'s approach is the
use of authority to initiate and sustain negotiations between the
parties.2 0 The typical O.A.U. intervention begins with conciliation
or mediation by a head of state. In the first dispute between
O.A.U. member states, the dispute between Morocco and Algeria
in 1963, Emperor Haile Selassie and President Modibo Keita took
on the role of peace-makers. They achieved a cease-fire and set
bilateral talks in motion. The negotiations resulted in a settlement.
The O.A.U. does not use professional mediators or arbitrators in
the search for a settlement. It uses the influence of its elder states-
men, who can command the respect and confidence of the parties
to a dispute. These statesmen are regarded as the embodiment of
wisdom, and therefore exert considerable authority. They play a
critical role in developing a consensus among O.A.U. members and
in persuading the parties to a dispute to modify their positions.
Finally, the O.A.U. has sought to develop its own norms for the
settlement of different types of conflicts, whether they are bound-
ary disputes or conflicts arising out of charges of subversion. The
O.A.U.'s experience in boundary disputes provides the clearest ex-
ample of the way in which norms have emerged for the settlement
of disputes in Africa. The African continent has few natural
'9 Z. CERVENKA, supra note 1, at 65-67.
20 See id. at 67-68.
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boundaries separating one nation from another. Ethnic groups, fur-
thermore, are often distributed across several nations. The bound-
aries which have been inherited from colonial times are arbitrary
and do not reflect the political, economic, and ethnic realities of
contemporary Africa. Consequently, in the post-colonial years
there were many territorial and boundary disputes among African
states. Sometimes these escalated into armed confrontation.
However, even though African states complained that colonial
boundaries were arbitrary and unsatisfactory, they became aware
that the constant revision of boundaries, by whatever means, car-
ried with it many dangers. Boundary revisions could change the
ethnic balance within a state and generate internal conflict. They
could open or close access to the sea. The granting of the right of
secession could lead to political disintegration. The potential for
havoc was considerable.
For a variety of reasons, therefore, the members of the O.A.U.
came to recognize that there were advantages to the maintenance
of the status quo as defined by colonial boundaries. From the first
boundary dispute, the O.A.U. sought to bring the parties back to
the status quo, and a working rule emerged that colonial bounda-
ries should be respected. This is now the norm that is brought to
bear whenever the O.A.U. must deal with a boundary or territorial
dispute.
The O.A.U. has not been so successful in developing guidelines
for the settlement of other kinds of disputes. Disputes over charges
of subversion or over ideological matters present more complex
problems. They do not yield readily to simple formulae. Nonethe-
less, the overall approach of the O.A.U. has often worked in other
kinds of disputes. Even where the O.A.U. has been unable to help
settle a dispute, it has usually been able to achieve a normalization
of relations between the parties. The O.A.U. clearly has a limited
ability to assist in the settlement of international disputes. Yet it
can and does play a useful role on the African continent and in
world affairs by virtue of what it is able to do.
V. CASE STUDIES
A. Algeria-Morocco:
In late 1963, hostilities broke out between Algeria and Morocco
in a part of the Sahara administered by the former but claimed by
the latter. More than 100 men died when Morocco took possession
of the disputed area. No foreign powers were involved, but African
[Vol. 13:371
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leaders were concerned that French and Soviet ties to the parties
might lead to foreign intervention. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethi-
opia and President Keita of Mali succeeded in arranging a cease-
fire. They also arranged an extraordinary meeting of the O.A.U.
Council of Ministers. This resulted in the appointment of an ad
hoc commission to study the dispute and to make recommenda-
tions for a settlement. Although the commission was not able to
put forward substantive proposals for a settlement, it was able to
secure agreements for the release of prisoners, the withdrawal of
troops, and the restoration of diplomatic relations. This led to di-
rect negotiations between Algeria and Morocco and, in 1968, to a
settlement. The settlement was based on the principle that colo-
nial boundaries should be maintained. The economic dispute be-
tween the parties was resolved by the creation of a jointly owned
company for the exploitation of minerals in the disputed area.21
B. The Civil War in the Congo:
In the case of the civil war in the Congo, the O.A.U. was con-
fronted with a very different kind of crisis. The Belgian supported
secession of Katanga triggered the crisis shortly after the Congo's
independence. The assassination of Patrice Lumumba and the at-
tempt to install a moderate government closely controlled by for-
eign powers deeply divided the Congo at the beginning of the
1960's. By 1963 the secession of Katanga had been ended. How-
ever, political turmoil in the Congo continued. Tshombe, the leader
of the attempted secession in Katanga, began to gather mercenary
forces to support a second bid for power. The heirs of Lumumba
formed a National Liberation Committee (C.N.L.) in late 1963. It
was based in two neighboring countries and sought to challenge the
authority of the Adoula Government.
In July 1964, Tshombe was sworn in as Prime Minister of the
Congo. This shocked the whole of Africa. African leaders regarded
Tshombe as responsible for the murder of Lumumba and for the
introduction of Rhodesian and South African mercenaries into the
Congo. The reaction inside the Congo was itself strong, and the
C.N.L. launched an offensive against the Congolese army, captur-
ing Stanleyville a short time after Tshombe assumed power.
2' For a general discussion of the Algerian-Moroccan dispute, see M. DONELAN & M.
GRIEVE, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: CASE HISTORIES 1945-1970 143-46 (1973); see also Meyers,
Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity, 28 INT'L ORG.
345, 354 (1974).
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The stage was set for a civil war which threatened a confronta-
tion between the major powers. Tshombe was supported by the
Western powers, particularly the United States. The C.N.L. re-
ceived support from the Soviet Union and China, although that
support was relatively small.
The O.A.U. met in September 1964 to discuss the crisis. Initially
the Council of Ministers sought to achieve national reconciliation
between the Tshombe Government and the Stanleyville regime, to
form a caretaker government of national unity, to hold free elec-
tions under O.A.U. control, and to bring about the end of foreign
intervention. It particularly emphasized the withdrawal of all for-
eign troops and mercenaries. Eventually, however, it succeeded
only in creating an ad hoc commission with two aims: to bring
about national reconciliation and to normalize relations between
the Congo and its neighbors.
The Kenyatta commission did succeed in normalizing relations
between the Congo and Burundi and Congo (Brazzaville). How-
ever, it was not successful in reconciling Tshombe with the leaders
of the C.N.L., and the civil war continued. By October 1964, after
fierce fighting between the Congolese army and its mercenaries on
the one hand, and the army of the C.N.L. on the other, the tide
seemed to turn against Tshombe. At that time, however, the
United States, Belgium, and Great Britain mounted a major mili-
tary operation at Stanleyville, where they dropped paratroops, cap-
tured Stanleyville, and ended any effective military challenge to
Tshombe.
Thus, despite its attempt to intervene over an extended period,
the O.A.U. was left in a position of helplessness in the face of a
civil war which involved major foreign powers. 22
C. Guinea-Ivory Coast:
In early 1967, Guinea arrested several Ivorian citizens and cap-
tured an Ivorian fishing trawler. The Guinea Government said that
the crew of the trawler had been planning to abduct the exiled for-
mer President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah. The President of Libe-
ria sought unsuccessfully to mediate the dispute.
In June of 1967, the Ivorian Government retaliated by detaining
Guinean officials who were in transit from a United Nations ses-
22 See generally Z. CERVENKA, supra note 1, at 84-96; M. DONELAN & M. GRIEVE, supra
note 21, at 203-09.
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sion and on their way back to Conakry. The Ivorian Government
stated that it would release the detained officials only when the
Ivorian citizens detained in Guinea were released.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations intervened in or-
der to secure the release of the persons detained by both govern-
ments. He was unsuccessful. He then requested that the O.A.U.
assume primary responsibility for the resolution of the dispute.
The Assembly of the O.A.U., in turn, requested the President of
Liberia to continue his efforts at mediation. With the backing of
the O.A.U., President Tubman succeeded in securing the release of
the prisoners.2"
D. The Nigerian Civil War:
The Nigerian civil war, in which Biafra sought to secede from
the Federation, followed two military coups and the slaughter of
Ibo people in the northern state of Kano. The coups, which took
place in 1966, unsettled the whole of Nigeria. In the internal con-
flicts that followed, the leaders of Nigeria were unable to agree on
a form of federation which would satisfy everyone. The proposal
eventually adopted by most leaders was rejected by the Military
Governor of the Eastern Region, Colonel Ojukwu. With the man-
date of the Eastern Consultative Assembly, he proclaimed an inde-
pendent state of Biafra in May 1967. There followed a long and
costly civil war in which one to two million people perished.
From the beginning, the Nigerian Government treated the seces-
sion as a strictly internal matter. However, a number of factors
prompted the O.A.U. to try to settle the conflict. The first was the
danger of foreign intervention. The United Kingdom and the So-
viet Union provided substantial supplies of arms to the federal
government. France and Portugal supplied Biafra. In addition, a
number of African countries recognized Biafra, so there was a clear
possibility of expanding foreign involvement. The third factor
which influenced the O.A.U. was the world campaign to assist the
encircled and starving population of Biafra.
At its 1967 meeting, against the opposition of Nigeria, the
O.A.U. Assembly took up the matter. However, it was unable to
consider the substantive issues which divided the federal govern-
ment and Biafra. This would have been open intervention in the
internal affairs of Nigeria and would have undermined the unity of
23 Meyers, supra note 21, at 361-62.
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the O.A.U. Instead, the Assembly created a special commission of
six heads of state to try to mediate the conflict. The Consultative
Committee on Nigeria, however, could not treat the parties as
equals. Its first communique, which set the tone for later O.A.U.
meetings on the question, affirmed the need to "preserve the unity
and territorial integrity of Nigeria." It was a bitter disappointment
for Biafra.24
Although the O.A.U. did arrange peace talks between the two
sides, the position of the federal government remained firm. The
O.A.U. had no way of pursuing the matter effectively. It could not
even deal with the member states who had recognized Biafra.
Thus, the O.A.U. was unable to play an effective role. The war con-
tinued until the federal government brought the Biafrans almost
literally to their knees. The O.A.U.'s principal achievement in the
Nigerian civil war was that it upheld the unity of African states. 5
E. The Western Sahara:
In 1967, Western Sahara was still a Spanish colony. Both Mo-
rocco and Mauritania laid claim to it. In the fall of 1967, the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations began to lay the basis for
decolonization of the territory. It asked Spain to begin prepara-
tions for a referendum under United Nations auspices in order to
allow the people of the territory to decide their future.
The problem was that the decolonization of the territory was ex-
pected, under the circumstances, to increase tensions between
competing neighboring states. Decolonization had to be carried out
in consultation with Morocco and Mauritania if a conflict between
the two was to be avoided.
By 1974, Morocco and Mauritania had developed a joint ap-
proach to the decolonization of the Western Sahara. However, the
General Assembly called for a postponement of the referendum
pending a judgment by the International Court of Justice of the
legal ties of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania at the time of
colonization. The Court decided that such ties existed but that
they should not prejudice the decolonization of the territory.
Spain then created an entirely new situation by transferring
power to a temporary administration of the territory in which both
Morocco and Mauritania were represented. At the end of February
See generally Andemichael, supra note 16, at 250-51; Z. CERVENKA, supra note 1, at 99.
" See Z. CERVENKA, supra note 1, at 108.
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1976, Spain terminated its presence in the Western Sahara, turn-
ing the territory over, in effect, to Morocco and Mauritania. Thus,
the views of the Saharan people were ignored. The United Na-
tions, facing the complication of a Moroccan-Mauritanian adminis-
tration, was placed in a situation where it could not easily press for
decolonization.
The result of these maneuvers was to set off a war. The
POLISARIO Front, which has a wide base of support among the
Saharan people, founded a Democratic Sahrawi Arab Republic.
This government was recognized by Algeria in 1976. POLISARIO
then began an armed struggle to end the occupation of Western
Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania.
The O.A.U. did not intervene in the situation until the meeting
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in the summer
of 1976. At that meeting, the Assembly called for an extraordinary
session of the O.A.U. to try to settle the conflict and to remove the
barriers to Saharan independence that had been raised by other
powers.
It took two years to convene the meeting called for in 1976. In
the meantime, for some six years the fighting in the Western Sa-
hara has continued, a plan for the settlement of the conflict has
been drawn up, Mauritania has withdrawn its claim and ended its
presence in the Western Sahara, many African states have recog-
nized the Democratic Sahrawi Arab Republic, and, by a recent de-
cision, the O.A.U. has admitted it as a member state. This latter
decision, however, has badly divided the O.A.U. itself, and a defi-
nite solution to the problem of the Western Sahara seems far off.26
VI. ASSESSMENT
We can see in retrospect that the Organization of African Unity
has had some success in the settlement of intra-regional disputes.
It is clear, however, that the Organization has had to play a limited
role in most African conflicts. Its ability to intervene is limited by
virtue of its limited powers and the limited resources at its dispo-
sal for pressing the parties in a dispute to settle. The O.A.U. can
mobilize authority and influence, but it lacks power. This is why it
has been relatively successful in helping to settle strictly African
disputes, and far less successful in helping to settle disputes in-
volving foreign powers. It was almost helpless in the case of the
See Andemichael, supra note 16, passim. Cf. Meyers, supra note 21, passim.
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Congo civil war, but it has been much more successful in disputes
between African states where the issues were truly local.
In the realm of strictly regional disputes, the O.A.U. has two
achievements to its credit. The first is the working rule that the
O.A.U. should be the first international forum for settling disputes
among African states. Repeatedly, the United Nations has pre-
ferred to send a dispute to the O.A.U. rather than take it up in the
Security Council. The "try the O.A.U. first" rule has probably
helped to resolve some disputes more rapidly than they would have
been resolved elsewhere, for the O.A.U. has been able to bring to
bear its quite unique procedures on states which respect African
authority and understand consensus. Other organizations might
have found it more difficult to approach disputes in the same man-
ner, and might have had correspondingly reduced chances of suc-
cess in assisting a settlement. Secondly, the norm that colonial
boundaries should be respected represents an important step in
the direction of stability in the relations between African states.
Finally, it is important to note that the O.A.U.'s most important
achievements in the settlement of disputes may lie outside the lim-
its of effort at settlement strictly speaking, for the most important
disputes in Africa have not been between member states of the
O.A.U., but between member states and the African colonial pow-
ers, particularly South Africa. The O.A.U. has been dedicated to
ending all forms of colonialism in Africa from the very beginning.
It has worked steadily toward that goal, and has made, without
any doubt, a fundamental contribution through its efforts to secure
the freedom of Guinea Bissau/Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique,
Zimbabwe and the independence of Namibia. If it has not directly
resolved these questions itself, it has nonetheless laid the basis,
through long and patient effort, for pressing toward a resolution of
colonial questions within the United Nations General Assembly
and Security Council. It has thus played a most important part in
helping to unite Africa and to clear the way for effective coopera-
tion among free and independent states throughout the continent.
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